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CONGRESSIONAL HUNGER CENTER 
Strengthening United Nations Human Rights Efforts in Rwanda!Bunmdi 
Progress Report, Number Three 
February 24, 1995 
The Congressional Hunger Center (CHC), in support of the human rights concerns ofits 
Chairman, Congressman Tony P. Hall, conducted another mission to Rwanda, Burundi 
and Geneva during the period February 5-14, 1995. This is part ofthe CHC's continuing 
effort, supported by the Reebok Foundation and several nongovernmental organizations, 
to facilitate the unprecedented deployment of United Nations human rights monitors to 
Rwanda. CHC staff confinned the following finctings and recommendations: 
I. The Human Rights Field Office, Rwandn (HRFOR) Becomes Fully Operational 
A Einding 
P.02109 
In sharp contrast to their findings in November, 1994, CHC staff on this visit found a 
functioning field office ofHRFOR in Kigali, and an increasingly effective team of 
approximately 100 of the total l47 UN human rights monitors approved for deployment in 
Rwanda. Monitors at most field sites are performing all the organic human rights 
functions required in Rwanda, ie., monitoring current abuses in both public and private 
sectors; conducting genocide investigations; and pto"Yiding technical cQoperation and 
advice in administration of justice. Alteady HRFOR is commencing a vital, perhaps the 
most definitive, and certainly the most cost-effective, impact on recovecy and nation-
building in Rwanda. Staffing, structure and leadership in the Kigali office have 
strengthened remarkably over the past two months. To be sure, European/African regional 
tensions have emerged in the Kigali office. Geneva is aware of these tensions and is taking 
pains to clarify job descriptions of senior officials to reduce misunderstandings. 
B. Recommendation 
Progress Illade by the Office Director Bill Clarance needs to be acknowledged and fully 
supported by the NGO and governmental comm.unities. Clara.nce should be pro·vided the 
security of a longer-term appointment, at least to the end of the 1995 calendar year. The 
Geneva headquarters must underline with Clarance's deputy the agreed division oflabor, 
i.e., that the deputy will concentrate primarily on administrative, logistics and operational 
support matters (while being the alter ego in Clarll.Ilce's absence)-- thus freeing Clarance 
to do what he does best, i.e., field operations. It is still very early in the operation to be 
able to place the HRFOR completely on auto-pilot. In the absence of adequate supporting 
adVisory and facilitating seJ:Yices from. other UN agencies (whose mandate it is to assure 
that all the pieces are in place for a successful hUlllall.itarian operation), the Congressional 
Hunger Center will need to continue filling this gap over the next several weeks. 
I 
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D.. The Human Rights Program in Rwanda Starts to get Respect 
A Finding 
Human rights field monitors get respect and perf'onnance from local civilian and military 
officials to the extent that the monitors establish productive relationships and add value to 
the Rwandan nation-bullding task. The more mature human rights staff are succeeding in 
establishing such relationships and in developing constructive partnerships with the Army, 
(RPA), gendarmerie, magistrates and local government officials. Recognition and respect 
from. fellow UN agencies is always the hardest for a new ''guy on the UN block., to come 
by. Yet the negative comments seem to be do'Wll sharply .from the CHC November visit 
and hints of positive UN acceptance in the UN fanilly are appearing in some quarters. 
Thls improved HRFOR professionalism and performance are due in no small measure to 
CHC's persistent advocacy and facilitation of I) Participatory preparedness training; 
2)Tougher, more realistic recruiting criteria; 3) Matching people deployments more 
closely with the vehicular and logistics deployments essential for mobility in the field; and 
4) SuppQrt to an operationally oriented office structure for HRFOR, Rwanda. CHC 
pressed for, and saw the HCHR achieve, the same standards for selection, trainfug and 
deployment of the European Union (EU) monitors as for the monitors from other sources 
(the EU monitors are just now in the process ofbeconling an organic part of the UN 
Rwandan operation). 
B. Reeomrr.<mdatiou. 
CHC must conrlnue to work to maintain the rigorous standards for personal recruitment, 
and to weed out those ,...,·ho prove to be unfit; to improve the standards for the 
participatory training workshops (especially, get rid of the dry lectures); to assure full 
integration of the EU monitors under Bill Clarance's leadership; to insist on frequent :flow 
of substantive operational information to interested UN member states (especially to 
donor states); and to help facilitate 11ubUo information on this extraordinazy example of 
impacting people protection and nation·building in a failed state. 
m. BRFOR Tailors its Operation to Needs on the Ground 
A. finding 
In Southeast Rwanda (the Kibungo area where a high Tutsi concentration existed 
pre-Apri16, 1994) revenge killings, arbitrary arrests and tonure by renegade soldiers and 
abusive local officials, have driven HRFOR into an intensive sutveillance operation. Bill 
Clarance invented it and dubbed it utactical monitoring.,. This creative effort is getting top 
government attention and suppon in Kigali. It seems to offet the best way to modify 
and/or stop the pattern of local abuses in perhaps the most dangerous quarter of Rwanda. 
HRFOR is going to the so~ of the on-going abuses that were first documented in the 
z. 
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Gersony assessment commissioned by the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCll) in 
late summer 1994. 
While HRFOR performs the other functions of its holistic mandate, including 
genocide investigation and technical cooperation in the Southeast as well, it is able to 
concentrate on these more acceptable sectors (to the Rwandan government) in such 
regions as Cyangugu alongside Lake Kivu in the Southwest. Here local civilian and 
militai}' officials, together \vith the populace, receive human rights education iu the 
schools; technical advisory services in administration of justice (helping on the caseload of 
over 20,000 prisoners in deplorable states of detention), and investigation of the honific 
acts of genocide that occurred post-Apri16, in the Cyangugu area. Such welcome and 
positive contn"butions make the less palatable pill of current abu~ monitoring easier to 
swallow. 
The UN human rights team in Cyangugu has had extraordinary success in 
cultivating professional and constructive relationships with local civilian and milita:ry 
officials. The more hopeful cli.tnate for human rights also owes a great deal to the 
Cyangugu Prefect; he is a graduate in human rights from the University ofLyon and is a 
major reason for the acceptance and success of the UN's holistic human rights efForts in 
that region. 
B. B.ecommendation 
The creative "tactical monitoring" initiative must be acknowledged (as a major 
innovation by the HRFOR Dkector Bill Clarance) and supported by both the host 
government and intemational community. The holistic package ofhuman rights service~ 
which can be administered in most of the rest of Rwanda, must be viewed as both orgauic 
and essential to the continued effectiveness of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
This holistic approach must be recognized as a sine qua non for all future human rights 
field operations, e.g., in Burundi. The UN Development Program (UNDP) needs to 
support this .function as an integral pan of the HCH'R's mandate and play an active 
fundraising role through Round Table donor conferences to enable the HCHR. to 
discharge this mainstream component of his responsibilities. 
IV. Human Rights Headquarters in Geneva Must Catch up with its Operational 
Culture in the Field 
A. Finding 
There is now a mentali~ and a developing Wture for human rights operations in 
the field. It is in Rwanda today; it must be in Burundi tomorrow; and it will be required in 
conjunction with all too many other current, and future, complex humanitarian 
emergencies. But for the Rwanda operation to maintain momentwn and succeed, for a 
Burundi operation to make an impact, indeed, for the future viability of the veey Office of 
the High Commissioner itsel( the HCHR must personally devote himself to the rapid 
development of both au operational culture and capaci~ within his immediate office in 
Geneva. (The immediate office of the new UN High Commissioner for Human rights is 
very small, understandably lacks an operational capability at this point, and must rely on 
the latgert legal papexwork-oriented Human Rights Center in Geneva for operational 
P.04109 
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backup required for Rwanda. Mr. Mautner-Markhofofthe Center is doing a herculeanjob 
in providing this support. His considerable skills could be leveraged greatly, however, ifhe 
were part of an augmented operational task force organic to the Office of the High 
Commissioner.) Failw'e or delay in developing this capacity in the High Commissioner's 
office effectively jeopardizes the Rwanda and Burundi operations. It may also place in 
question the very future of maintaining a Human Rights High Commissioner in the United 
Nations. 
B RecommMdation 
While High Commissioner Ayala-Lasso indicated in a meeting with CHC 
Executive Director Gene Dewey on February 13, that he might need to sweep an 
operational capability into his own office for Rwanda, he still hoped to be able to mount 
future field operations out of the Human Rights Center in Geneva {in pan because oftwf 
concerns within the Center itself). Dewey told him, in effect, that there just was not time 
for the Center to shift gears from a radically different secretariat role to an operatiQDal 
field sup.pon role. US officials in Washington and Geneva must continually reinforce the 
imperative for an organic, holistic, human rights operational capability in Ayala-Lasso's 
immediate office. And the international humanitarian system -- NGOs, UN agencies, an.d 
serious UN member states need to accept, and support the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights as the fotnth (in addition to UNHCR, UNICEF and 
WFP), and fully, operational agency in the UN humanitarian constellation. 
V. The Rwandan Government Needs Credit for Human Rights Progress, per se, and 
to Reinforce ~lore Positive Performance "''here its Record is Still Weak 
A. Finding 
There is commendable discipline and significant human rights progress on the pan 
of senior Rwandan government officials in Kigali -- especially Vice President and Defense 
Minister I<agame. But Kagame. along with some other senior officials, tends to regard the 
current abuse monitoring role of:H:RFOR as a vote of no-confidence in the ability of the 
govemm.ent to protect its ovm citizens. There is insufficient feedback, crediting him with 
doing good things, to counteract his negative perception of the UN hwnan rights e.ffotts 
Recommendation 
Visitors to Kagame, and to other senior Rwandan offi~ials probably need to 
overcorrect a bit by acknowledging the RPFs statesmanship in accepting UN human rights 
monitors and in taking on the less palatable aspects {i.e. the HRFOR upolicing" function 
VYith respect to cunent abuses) along with those the RPF welcomes (accountability for 
genocide and technical cooperation). CHC staff recommended to HCHR, and he 
accepted, the idea of making field visits on his next Rwanda trip (probably around March 
10) in the company of Vice President Kagam.e. They would visit the weak spots in the 
Southeast where the vice president and HCHR could see together the problem of abusive 
local officials and the need for tactical monitoring. HCHR would be able to commend, 
and reinforce, Kagam.e's action in dealing with these officials (he claims to have fired some 
of them). In the Southwest (Cyangugu area) they would see together the difference that 
t'.UOIU':::I 
cooperative officials make. and the major contnbutions HRFOR is making, to confidence 
and nation-building in Rwanda. Such steps could contribute to a self..fultiUing prophecy in 
terms of continued improvements in official Rwandan behavior. 
VI. Internal Strengthening of Some 1JN Agencies (Especially DHA), and Mutual 
Reinfor~ement From Others (UNDP) are Essential to Effective UN Human Rights 
Field Operations. 
A Internal Strengthen1ng ... the UN Department ofHumanitarian Affairs (DHA) 
1. Findings 
DHA's intended function is not to D.Ul, or even coordinate, complex: humanitarian 
operations. UN member states (with strong support in the US Congress from 
Representative Tony Hall) created DHA in 1992 to facilitatJ: iutemational humanitarian 
operations -- whether emergency relief; or human rights -- and make SUCIJhey go well. 
As suc:h, DHA is the agency accountable -- to the Secretary General, to UN members and 
emergency victims-- for how well, and how poorly, an operation goes. Yet, UN member 
states have not supported, or insisted sufficiently on the imperative for DHA to organize 
and staff itself to assure that such vital field operations as the Rwanda human rights 
monitor deployment go well. Largely because of this lack of follow-through by member 
states which created D~ the Congressional Hunger Center faced up to the need to help 
fill this gap for the Rwandan human rights operation. Because the office of the HCHR. was 
so new and inexperienced, "value-added" from outside was needed to help assure 
yebjc;ula( and logistical deployments matched people deployments to Rwanda; HCHR 
needed_assistance in qualicygersonucl selection and in f1Uality readin~s training of field 
monitors; and above all, it needed dedicat~d fundrajsing eftbas to se~e adequate 
financial support through the UN's consolidated appeal process. The Congressional 
Hunger Center is helping with this stop-gap role, pending development of such a capacity 
within the UN itself 
2. Recommendation 
The Congressional Hunger Center is prepated to continue its operational support 
role to UN humanitarian operations, provided sufficient private funding becomes available. 
The longer term solution, however, is to tl.esh out this capacity within the UN Department 
of Humanitarian Affairs. Since DHA is already a major agenda item for the summer 
session of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in Geneva, the Rwanda 
human rights deployment o.ffers a classic example of the kind ofhumanitarlan operation 
DHA was created to facilitate. The US Delegation to ECOSOC should build on this 
examplet recall the DHA strengthening plan (the Dewey "Get-Well" proposal) the US 
Govetnnlent pushed in the 1993 ECOSOC session, and·develop support in the 1995 
ECOSOC meeting to achieve reforms and strengthening which would enable DHA to 
perfonn fully its intended facilitating role in future human rights deployments (e.g., a 
preventive deployment to Burundi) and other major field operations. 
S. 
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B Mumal Reinforcement ... The UN Development PrQII'm (UNDP) 
J. Findings 
Technical cooperation for administrati-ve of justice is a central, organic feature of 
the UNHCHR.'s holistic human rights operation in Rwanda. The UN Development 
Program (UNDP), in its responsibilities to oversee the Round Table fundraising process 
for Rwanda, has a unique opportunity to reinforce the HCHR's primacy in implementing 
technical cooperation in human rights for R.wanda. UNDP also needs to lobby for the 
HCHR -- both in the Round Table meetings and m the DHA Consolidated Appeals --to 
work with key donor states to assure fWl funding for the modest human rights cost 
components in HCHR.•s Rwanda programs. 
2.Reconunendadon 
The US should develop a consensus among key UNDP govemiug council 
members to assure full UNDP suppntt, especially financial support, to the UNHCHR in 
implementing this core program .in Rwanda. Similarly, the US needs to press for support 
from both DHA and UNDP for adequate funding for an immediate preventive human 
rights monitQ[ deployment to Burundi. 
For the High Commissioner's upcoming visit to Rwanda, it is important that he 
receive an invitation from the Rwandan govenunent, stressing the importance of the 
HCHR using the visit to articulate and accelerate his already developed plan of action as 
th UN · fl h · t · • h d • · • r· · e executtve agentor tee nzca cooperatJOU tn Le a mmJstrattan o~sttce. 
vn. The High Commissioners for Refugees and Human Rights Need to Share 
Information 
A Fjpding 
P.0?/09 
Information on root causes for refugees fleeing Rwanda, and refusing to renun to 
Rwanda, is vitally important to human rights teams in implementing tech.uical assistance 
programs and building confidence inside Rwanda. UNHCR field staff in Zaire have 
already contacted UNHCHR staff across Lake Kivu in Cyangugu, suggesting that they 
determine root cause through direct iutervie\VS in the Zaire (Bukaw) camps.. Geneva 
human rights headquarters cwrently holds that its staff can only work in Rwanda, 
UNHCR, meanwhile has not received, and/or not responded to any requeSt to share this 
''root cause" information obtained by its protection officers in Zaire, Bwundi and Tanzania 
camps. 
B. Recommendation 
CHC staff raised the problem with IVIr. Mautner-Markhof at the Human Rights 
Center on February 13. ?vlautner-Markhofagreed to look into the possibilities of joint 
UNHCRIUNHCHR teams interviewing in the first asylum camps, so as to get around the 
problem of operating unilaterally outside Rwanda. 
Similarly, a request needs to go to the High Commissioner for Refugees to have 
her regional coordinator, CaiToll Faubert~ share agreed essential elements of information 
on a regular, freq11:ent basis \\ith Bill Clarance in Kigali. 
t. 
vm. An Historic Window is Open, Albeit Briefly, for a Preventive Deployment of 
Human Rights ~looitors in Burundi 
A. Eindinis 
Burundi is already far doWn the slippery slope to a Rwanda-like apocalypse. The 
country is an armed camp -- with machetes and Kalashnikofs at the ready (and too many 
of them already in. use, even as you read this) at every level ofHutu and Tutsi society. 
Both the American ambassador and the Secretary General's special representative, have 
threats on their lives for trying to get at the truth of atrocities already occurring. Killings 
and severe human rights abuses are a daily, and nightly, way oflife. Yet Burundi's 
President believes there is still time to help Vvith history's first-ever preventive deploymev.t 
of human rights monitors. The committed, but fragile UN Human_ Rights Office in 
Bujumbura joins the Burundi President in this desperate appeal for monitors to provide a 
presence throughout the Burundi countryside. The President's office appealed to CHC's 
executive director Dewey on February 11 for help in formulating and implementing such 
an unprecedented request. Dewey agreed to help, and suggested that the President's 
Special Assistant also insure that the President's speech to the UNHCR/OAU-sponsored 
Refugee Conference in Bujumbura on February 15 include a call for this human rights 
presence. This was done. Dewey further relayed this request and challenge to the Bunmdi, 
and US, permanent representatives to the UN in Geneva, to the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, and to key contacts on the National Security CoU1lcil staff and the 
Human Rights Bureau of the State Department. 
B B.ecpmmendatiOJlS 
Again, here is a gap and an apparent need for someone outside the formal UN 
strucrure to perform the DHA-type legwork of making this human rights presence in 
Burundi a reality. This historic preventive deployment should be facilitated through the 
following three-track approach: · 
1. Arrange for the formal request to be drafted from the President ofBunm~ to 
be relayed through the High Commissioner for Human Rights (with a copy to the 
Sectetary-Generat•s Special Representative in BUlUlldi) to the UN Secretary-General. 
(CHC staff requested the Human Rights Officer in Bujumbura to work with the assistant 
to the president, Kavakourie, who is the former ambassador to Waslrlngto~ to draft and 
dispatch this formal request). 
2. Press for early introduction and passage in the current session ofthe UN Human 
Rights Commissioner in Geneva a resolution calling for inlmediate funding for, and 
deplo}ment ot; a preventive human rights monitoring effort throughout the entire country 
of Burundi (CHC staff received encouragement for this idea .from Political Counsellor 
Peter Eichert at the US Mission, Geneva. CHC's executive director requested the Burundi 
permanent representative in Geneva to work with Eichert and other mends o£Bumndi to 
bring this about. Key contacts in Washington Y~·ere urged to include instructions 
supponing this plan to the US Delegation to the current session of the UN Human rights 
Commission in Geneva.). 
t-'.U~/U~ 
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... 
. . 
3. Organize, with State Department's Human Rights Buteau and like-minded 
legislators a joint executive/legislative lobbying effort with UN member states of the 
Human Rights Commission ·- both to pass the preventive deployment resolution, and to 
connnit .fimcling, on a hlgh priority basis, for early implementation on the ground. Parallel 
efforts must be made with the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and the UN 
Peacekeeping Department to factor into the hUDWJ. rights deployment package a workable 
security component for the monitors, since threats to such a presence are tar greater in 
Burundi than in Rwanda. These efforts could well be the most .lmpottant, and cost-
effective, investments that the US goveilliXleot, the UN Human Rights Commission, and 
indeed the international community as a whole, could make in the next four weeks. 
